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[39 C.2d

[L. A. No. 21986. In Bank. Nov. 25, 1952.]

DA1SY M. DE BURGH, Appellant, v. ALBERT RAYMOND
DE BURGH, Respondent.
[1] Divorce - Extreme

[2]
[3]

[4]

[6]

[6]

[7]

Cruelty - Justification - Provocation. Cruelty that is provoked does not give rise to a cause of
action for divorce.
Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-To establish recrimination, a cause of divorce must be shown. (Civ.
Code, § 122.)
Id.-Defenses-Provocation and Recrimination.-Provoeation
and recrimination are not complementary, but mutually exclusive, defenses in divorce cases.
Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justification-Provocation.-To justify
extreme cruelty by one spouse under the doctrine of provocation, the misconduct of the other spouse must itself be a serious
violation of marital obligations.
Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justi1ication-Provocation.-Evidence
in wife's divorce action that defendant's acts of cruelty took
place from date of marriage until separation of parties, and
defendant's concession at trial that his allegations of plaintiff's
cruelty were based solely on her accusations that he was dishonest and a homosexual, charges that were made no earlier
than two or three days before the separation, do not sustain
a judgment denying plaintiff a divorce on the theory that defendant's cruelty was provoked by her.
Id. - Causes for Denying Divorce:- Recrimination. - Every
showing by defendant of a cause of divorce does not constitute
an absolute or a recriminatory defense; under Civ. Code,
§§ 111, 122, there is the additional requirement that such a
cause of divorce must be "in bar" of plaintiff's cause of divorce.
Id-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Defense of
recrimination may be asserted in a divorce action without
regard to whether plaintiff or defendant was the first at fault.

[1] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 35; Am.Jur., Divorce
and Separation, § 85.
[2] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce
cases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See, also, Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 58; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233.
McK. Dig. References: [1,4,5] Divorce, §23; [2,6,7,11-19)
Divorcl', ~ 60: f3] Divorce, §§ 23, 60; [8] Marriage, § 1 j [9,10]
Divorce, § 5; [20] Trial, § 286; [21] Divorce, §§ 198, 234(2);
[22] Divorce, § 198; [23] Divorce, § 234(2).
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[8] Marriage-Nature of Relation.-Marriage is a great deal more
than a contract, and it ~lIn he terminated only with the consent of the state.
[9] Divorce-Public Policy.-In a divorce proceeding the court
must consider not merely the rights and wrongs of the parties
as in contract litigation, but the public interest in the institution of marriage.
[10] !d.-Public Policy.-Public policy does not discourage divorce
where the relations between husband and wife are such that
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed.
[11] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Civ. Code.
§ 122, requiring that defendant prove a cause of divorce against
plaintiff to establish the defense of recrimination, is a departure from the former rule that plaintiff be "without reproach," and rejects the strict rule of recrimination of the
ecclesiastical courts.
[12] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Respect
for the public interest has formed the basis of a recognized
exception to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, with
which the defense of recrimination has become increasingly
identified since enactment of the Civil Code.
[13] ld.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-In enacting Civ. Code, § 122, the Legislature intended that in divorce
litigation the fault of the plaintiff should have no more significance than elsewhere in the law.
[14] ld.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Rule that
equity does not deny relief on the ground of plaintiff's unclean
hands when to do so would be harmful to the public interest
is particularly appropriate in marital litigation, where the
social consequences of the court's decree are of the utmost
importance.
[15] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-The doctrine of recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean hands of
which it is a part, is neither puristic nor mechanical, but an
equitable principle to be applied according to the circumstances
of each case and with a proper respect for the paramount in- ,
terests of the community at large. (Disapproving Stoeasey v. .
Sweasey, 126 Cal. 123, 129-130, 58 P. 456; Mattson v. Mattson,
181 Cal. 44, 47, 183 P. 443; HeZpZing v. HeZpZing, 50 CaI.App.
676,680-681,195 P. 715; Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Ca1.App.2d 458,
459, 129 P.2d 117; and Gough v. Gough, 101 Cal.App.2d 262,
268-269, insofar as these cases support a mechanical application
of the doctrine of recrimination.)
[16] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-Giv. Code,
§ 122, imposes on the trial judge the duty to determine whether
the fault of plaintiff in a divorce action is to be regarded as
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"in bar" of plaintiff's cause of divorce based on the fault of
defendant.
[17] Id.-Ca.uses for Denying Divorce-Recrimina.tion.-Application of strict rule of recrimination in wife's divorce action
does 1I0t operate with equal justice where defendant, as the
SpOUSI' entrusted by law with management and control of the
community property (Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), is in a
position to use that property for his personal benefit and
has a large discretion as to performance of his obligation
to support plaintiff.
[18] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-There can
be no precise formula for determining when a cause of action
shown against a plaintiff is to be considered a bar to his
suit for divorce, for the divorce court, as a court of equity, is
clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements
of justice in each particular case.
[19a, 19b] Id.-Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination.-To
decide the issue raised by a plea of recrimination in a divorce
case, the court should consider the prospect of reconciliation,
including the ages and temperaments of the parties, the length
of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their
marital misconduct, the duration and apparent finality of
separation, etc. j the effect of the marital conflict on the parties,
their children, and the community; and the comparative fault
or guilt of the parties.
[20] 'l'rial-Findings-Neeessity for.-It is essential that findings
be made on every material issue raised by the pleadings.
[21] Divorce - Permanent Alimony: Disposition of Community
Property.-If a divorce is granted one party where both parties
were guilty of acts of cruelty against the other, alimony and
more than half of the community property may be awarded
to the prevailing spouse as in any other case.
[22] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-If a divorce is granted to both
parties, alimony may be awarded to either, for the basis of
liability for alimony is the granting of a divorce against the
person required to pay it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.)
[23] Id.-Disposition of Community Property.-When a divorce is
granted to both parties for acts of cruelty by each against the
other, neither party is innocent within the meaning of the
rule permitting an award of more than half of the community
property only to an innocent spouse (see eiv. Code, § 146),
and the community property must be equally divided.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Julius V. Patrosso, Judge. JUdgment reversed; appeal from
order dismissed.
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Action and cross-action for divorce. Judgment denying
divorce to either party, reversed.
Max Fink, Jerry Rolston, Cyrus Levinthal and Leon E.
Kent for Appellant.
Donald Armstrong for Respondent.
THA YKOR, J .-Plaintiff Daisy M. De Burgh and defendant Albert Raymond Dc Burgh were married in California
in October, 1946. They separated in February, 1949, and
in the same year plaintiff brought this action for divorce on
the ground of extreme cruelty. Defendant filed a crosscomplaint for divorce, also on the ground of extreme cruelty.
The allegations of cruelty were denied in the answers filed
by each party. The trial court found "that each of the
parties to this action has been guilty of acts of cruelty towards the other, and that such acts of cruelty by each toward
the other, were provoked by the acts of the other." The
court decided that "each party has been guilty of recrimination and neither is entitled to a divorce from the other." The
court entered judgment that plaintiff take nothing by her
complaint and that defendant take nothing by his crosscomplaint. Plaintiff appeals" from the judgment signed and
entered by the court" and from the order denying her motion for a new trial. Since the latter order is nonappealable,
the appeal therefrom must be dismissed.
The evidence regarding cruelty is in conflict; it supports
the finding that each party has been cruel to the other. Plaintiff's evidence ·tended to show that defendant was frequently
intoxicated to excess, that he inflicted physical injury upon
plaintiff on several occasions, that he boasted of his relations
with other women, that he unreasonably criticized plaintiff's
daughter, that he unjustly berated plaintiff concerning a former suitor, and that, a1thou~h he was a lavish spender in
other ways, he was penurious with plaintiff. Defendant's
evidence indicated that plaintiff had unjustly accused him
of dishonesty and homosexuality and had communicated to
his business associate similar false and malicious statements.
Since the trial court found that defendant was ~ui1ty of
arts of cruelty towards plaintiff, it is clear that the judgment denying plaintiff n rlivorce is not on the ground that
plaintiff failed to prove the all(>~ations of cruelty in her
complaint. The judgmcnt thus must be based either on the

862

DE BURGH V. DE BURGH

[39 C.2d

finding that defendant's cruelty was provoked by plaintiff
or on the ground that defendant established the defense of
recrimination.
The finding that the cruelty of each party was provoked
by the other party is inconsistent with the conclusion that
recrimination was established. [1] Cruelty that is provoked
(loes not give rise to a cause of action. (Truax v. Truax, 62
Cal.App.2d 441, 444 [145 P.2d 88] ; Popescu v. Popesc11, 46
Cal.App.2d 44, 49 [115 P.2d 208].) [2] To establish recrimination, however, a cause of divorce mustbe shown. (Civ.
Code, § 122; "Mayo v. Mayo, 3 Ca1.2d 51, 56 [43 P.2d 535] ;
Sm1'th v. Smith, ]]9 Cal. 183, 189-190 [48 P. 730, 51 P. 183] ;
Haskill v. Haskill, 56 Cal.App.2d 204, 208 [132 P.2d 294].)
[3] Provocation and recrimination, therefore, are not complementary, but mutually exclusive, defenses. [4] To jus- i
tify extreme cruelty by one spouse under the doctrine of I
provocation, the misconduct of the other spouse must itself
be a serious violation of marital obligations. (See Eidenmuller v. Eidenmuller, 37 Cal. 364, 364c365; Popescu v. Popescu, supra, 46 Cal.App.2d 44, 50.) [6] The record in the
present case fails to disclose any such violation on plaintiff's part that would justify the physical brutality and other
misconduct of defendant. Defendant's acts of cruelty, as
set forth in plaintiff's evidence, took place from the date of
marriage until the separation of the parties, whereas defendant freely conceded at the trial that his allegations of
plaintiff's cruelty were based solely upon plaintiff's accusations that he was dishonest and a homosexual, charges that
were made no earlier than two or three days before the separation. Thus, although the evidence would support the finding that defendant's cruelty provoked the false accusations
made by plaintiff, there is no evidence of any earlier misconduct by plaintiff that would justify defendant's cruelty.
Under these circumstances, the decision of the trial court
rannot be supportE'd upon the theory of provocation rather
than recrimination.
The determinative question on this appE'al, therefore. is
whethE'r the findings and conclusions in tbis case warrant
app1iC'ation of the 110ctrine of rerrimination. It is apparent
from tilP Trmarks of the trial jul1~e lit the rlose of the trial
thnt h(' beJif'wd that th(' transgressions of each part? neeessal'i1~' pTecll1~el1 th<' grantin~ of a ilivorce to either.
On
thr otllf'r hani!. thr lan~lla~(> of s(>C'tion ]22 of the Ch·n Col1<'
indielltes thai the trial court may haye abused its discretion
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in disregarding the requirement therein that the cause of
divorce of which one party is found guilty must be "in bar"
of that party's ground of divorce against the other party.
To resolve this conflict, wc have studied the history of the
doctrine of recrimination, its objectives, and the wording and
legislative background of the applicable statutes.
[6] It has sometimes been assumed that any cause of
divorce constitutes a recriminatory defense. The legislative
language, however, is ill-adapted to such a broad purpose.
Read together, sections 111 and 122 of the Civil Code provide: "Divorces must be denied upon . . . a showing by the
defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar
of the plaintiff's cause of diyorce." Had the Legislature
meant to make every cause of divorce an absolute defense,
it could easily have provided that: "Divorces must be denied
upon ... a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce
against the plaintiff.' , We are bound to consider the additional requirement that such a cause of divorce must be "in
bar" of the plaintiff's cause of divorce.
Much of the confusion concerning recrimination in Cali·
fornia has proceeded from the erroneous discussion of the
subject in Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249 [70 Am.Dec. 717),
which was decided before recrimination became a part of the
statutory law. It was stated in that case that this defense
is based on the doctrine that one who violates a contract containing mutual and dependent covenants cannot complain
of its breach by the other party. Logically, such a theory
would permit the party against' whom the first marital offense
was committed to ignore thereafter the duties imposed by
the marriage "contract," for in contract law a material
breach excuses further performance by the innocent party.
(Restatement of Contracts, § 274; Cal. Civ. Code, § 1689(2).)
[7] In fact, however, the defense may be asserted without
regard to whether the plaintiff or the defendant was the first
at fault. (Pullen v. Pullen & Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203, 86
T.L.R. 506.)
[8] The deceptive analogy to contract law ignores the
basic fact that marriage is a great deal more than a contract.
It can be terminated only with the consent of the state.
[9] In a divorce proceeding the court must consider not
merely the rights and wrongs of the parties as in contract litigation, but the public interest in the institution of marriage.
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the
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personal affections that cnnoblcand enrich human life. It
channels biological drives that might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of children in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from
one generation to anot.her; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since
the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster
and preserve marriage. But when a marriage has failed and
the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family
life are no longer served and divorce will be permitted.
[10] "[P]ublic policy does not discourage divorce where
the relations between husband and wife are such that the
legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed."
(Hill v. H~U, 23 Ca1.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] ; Weu v. We'll,
37 Ca1.2d 770, 783-784 [236 P.2d 159] ; see, also, Saltzgaver
v. Saltzgaver, 182 Md. 624, 636-637 [35 A.2d 810] ; opinion
of Bickley, J., in Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 489 [50 P.2d
264, 101 A.L.R. 635].)
.
The chief vice of the rule enunciated in the Cona:p.t case is
its failure to recognize that the considerations of policy that
prompt the state to consent to a divorce when one spouse has
been guilty of misconduct are often doubly present when both
spouses have been guilty. The disruption of family relationships, the clandestine associations with third parties, and
the oppressive effect upon children and the community are
intensified. It is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when the courts use it as a device for
punishment.
Moreover. the historical discussion of the doctrine of recrimination in the Conant case is inaccurate. The court
relied mainly on the decisions of the eminent English ecclesiastical jurist, Lord Stowell. It is si~ificant that in his later
utterances Lord Stowell viewed with regret the illogical and
pernICIOUS consequencp.s of a mechanical application of the
doctrine. 1 Even the medieval canon law, upon which Lord
1"1 eannot blind myself to the fact, that the modem course of life
and manners does not furnish those corrections of the mischiefs that
may follow, which the Canon I.aw had anticipated in connection with its
rule. There is no return to eohabitation, nor are there any means to be
resorted to for the purpose of compelling it. In the state of separation,
whether authorized or merely conventional, which usually takes place,
there is certainly the inereased danger of a spurious offspring; and as
the regulation of property exists among us, the danger of separate debts,
to the great e'\"entual injury of the husband and his legitimate family."
(Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Bag.Con. 292, 302, 161 Eng.Rep. 747, 751.)

)
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Stowell relied, did not carry rrcrimination to the extreme of
the Conant casc; althongll permitted as a bar when the plaintiff songht a diyol'cf' for adnltery, this defense was 110t acrepted against u ('a\lse of (li\'orce ha,;r(l on cruelty, for the
«hurch Juwyf'I'S }'('alizf'(l that jlllhlil' policy was not served by
forcing a wife, e\'ell if guilty, to retnrn to a home where her
life was in dallg-PI'. (Sanchez, Dr Sando :Matrimonii Sacramento, Lib. X, Disp. 18, No.5, cited by Neuner, Modern
Divorce Law, 28 Iowa L.Hev. 272, 279, n. 21. See, also,
opinion of Lonl Stowell in Chamber~ v. Chambers, 1 Hag.
Con. 439, 452, 161 Eng.Rep. 610, 614.)
In any event ecclesiastical authorities are not relevant in
vie,v of the fact that ecclesiastical courts could not grant absolute divorce. They could decree only limited divorce, equivalent to a judicially recognizrd separation. Such a court's
action was usually limited to a drtermination of certain property rights of the parties or the husband's duty of support.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that ecclesiastical lawyers
placed morc emphasis upon tlle comparative guilt of the parties
than Parliament did in cases of absolute divorce. Parliamcnt appears to haye tempered the doctrine of recrimination
with discretion. On the question of recrimination in cases of
absolute divorce, the Conant opinion, necessarily looking for
its authorit~· to parliamentary practice, relied exclusively
upon Simmons' Case, 12 C. & F. 339, 8 Eng.Rep. 1438, in
which Parliament denied a divorce,s overlooking other cases
involving recrimination where Parliament allowed divorce.
(See, for example, Major Campbell's Case, 42 H. of L. Jour.
]41, reprinted in MacQueen, 1.... Practical Treatise on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords [1842], p. 590.)
'Even in this area, the ecclesiastical law and common law were not in
agreement. For a collection of cases, see Beamer, The Doctrine of Be .
crimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 Univ. of Kansas City L. Rev.
213, 222 .. 236.
'Strictly speaking, Simmons' Case did not turn upon recrimination.
Adultery on the part of the plaintiff bnshand was alleged, but the House
of Lords refused to decide whether or not that recriminatory defense had
been proved. Instead, tlle divorce was denied on the ground that the
busband had dl'iycn Ilis wife and d:lUgllter into the streets and, in spite
of ample menns, IHid refused to support them; this conduct on his part
directly led to the wife's becoming 1\ street·walker and prostitute. In
reality, therefore, Simmons' Case is to be viewed as an example of the
doctrine of proYocntion. (Cf. Johnsoll v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 459, 460;
Truax v. Truax, 62 Cal.App.2d 441, 444 [145 P.2d 88); Popescu v.
Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44,49 [115 P.2d 208); Annen v. Annen, 79 Cal.
App. 626, 627·628 [250 P. 580).)
39 C.2d-2B

)
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Only a year before the Conant decision, in fact, Parliament
had created jurisdiction in the English courts to grant absolute divorce and in so doing expressly provided for judicial
discretion on the issue of recrimination. (Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § 31.)
The California Legislature, in enacting the Civil Code in
1872, did not follow the principles of the Conant case. The
code provisions on recrimination made two important depar- .
tures from the existing law.
[11] First, the code requires that the defendant prove a
cause of divorce against the plaintiff to establish this defense.
The requirement of the Conant case that plaintiff be "without'
reproach" no longer prevails. (Mayo v. Mayo, 3 Cal.2d 51,
56 [43 P .2d 535] ; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183, 189-190 [48
P. 730, 51 P. 183] ; White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 452 [23 P.
276, 7 L.R.A. 799] ; Haskill v. Haskill, 56 Cal.App.2d 204,
208 [132 P.2d 294] ; Popescu v. Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44,
49 [115 P.2d 208] ; Hilton v. Hilton, 54 Cal.App. 142, 149
[201 P. 337] ; Klemme1' v. Klemmer, 42 Ca1.App. 618, 622 [187
P. 85].) The dictum to the contrary in Shapiro v, Shapiro,
127 Cal.App. 20, 24 [14 P.2d 1058], is without support even
in the textbook authority cited and is clearly opposed to the
statute.
Second, as shown by the notes of the commissioners who
drafted the code, the Legislature rejected the strict rule of
recrimination of the ecclesiastical courts. Significantly,
neither the Conant case nor any other divorce cases appear
among the precedents listed by the commissioners as the basis
of the statute. It is apparent from the decisions that were
listed that the Legislature intended that divorce cases involving recrimination be governed by the same principles that
apply generally throughout our jurisprudence. Although the
plaintiff's fault has always been regarded as an important
element in the decision of any case, our courts have traditionally refused to exalt that element above the public interest. Thus, in Freeman v. Sedwick, 6 Gill. (Md.) 28, 40
[46 Am.Dec. 650], a fraudulent conveyance case cited by the
commissioners, Mr. Justice Story's Equity Jurisprudence is
quoted as follows: "Relief is not granted, where both parties
are truly in pari delicto, unless in cases where public policy
would thereby be promoted." (Vol. I, p. 317, § 298; see, also,
14th ed. [1918], vol. I, pp. 395-398, § 421.) [12] This respect for the public interest has formed the basis of a recognized exception to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands,
j
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with which the defense of recrimination has become increasingly identified since the enactment of the code. [13] It is
dear that the Legislature, in relying upon judicial principles
of general application, intended that in divorce litigation the
fault of the plaintiff should have no more significance than
!'lsewhere in the law. Apparently with this purpose in mind
it worded the statute to require that a cause of divorce shown
by defendant must be "in bar" of the plaintiff's cause of
divorce. It would have defeated its own purpose had it closed
the avenues to divorce when the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. The perpetuation of an unwholesome relationship would be a mockery of marriage.
The California cases decided since the enactment of the
Civil Code contain little analysis or discussion of the principles governing the defense of recrimination. In Brenot v.
Brellot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [36 P. 672], this court correctly
stated the rule to be that C C a court of equity is authorized to
enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both
parties are seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them
to be equally guilty of the misconduct alleged." (Italics
added.) Again, in Glass v. Glass,4 Ca1.App. 604, 607 [88 P.
734], the appellate court, in affirming the judgment with regard to propert.y issues, observed wit.hout objection that the
trial court had found both parties guilty of extreme cruelty
but nevertheless had granted the plaintiff a divorce. In some
cases, however, it has been assumed, apparently with the
acquiescence of the parties themselves, that the mere showing
of a cause of divorce against the plaintiff is sufficient. (See
Sweasey v. Sweasey, 126 Cal. 123, 129-130 [58 P. 456] j Mattson v. Mattson, 181 Cal. 44, 47 [183 P. 443]; HelpZing v.
Helpling, 50 Cal.App. 676, 680-681 [195 P. 715]; Gough v.
Gough, 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 268-269 [225 P.2d 668].) This
failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the statute
has enabled the thinking engendered by the Conant case to
survive by default. Important developments of the past
several decades have made it increasingly clear that the courts
can no longer decline to exercise the discretion inherent in
the clean hands doctrine.
The rising divorce rate in the United States has compelled
a growing recognition of marriage failure as a social problem
and correspondingly less preoccupation with technical marital
fault. This trend is strikingly exemplified by the recent
4111wndment of section 92 of the Civil Code d('signatin~ in-
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curable insanity as a ground for divorce. Formerly, no matter how vicious the conduct of an insane spouse, he could
not be divorced, for the law refused to find in him the guilt
essential to a marital offense. (See Cohn v. Cohn, 85 Cal.
108, 109 [24 P. 659] ; Wray v. Wra,y, 19 Ala. 522, 525; 4
A.L.R. 1333; 42 A.L.n. 1531.) The Legislature has come to
realize, howewr, that when a union is dominated by insanity,
fulfilment of tIle norlllal purposes of marriage is hopeless.
'What was once a bar to divorce is now recognized as a justification for diyon·e. Still more striking ill recognition of this
trend has been the enactment of legislation in many states
authorizing divorce when the spouses have lived apart for a
required number of years. Marriage failure, rather than the
fault of the partirs, is the basis upon which such divorces are
granted. (See George v. George, 56 Ney. 12, 17-18 [41 P.2d
]059, 97 A.L.R. 983] ; Lemp Y. Lemp, 62 Nev. 91, 101-102
[141 P.2d 2]2, 148 A.L.R. 1104] ; 51 A.L.R. 763; 97 A.L.R.
985; 111 A.L.R. 867; 152 A.L.R. 336; 166 A.L.R. 498. Of.
Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 ::\.1\1.224,229-234 [174 P.2d 826].)
It would be froward indeed for the conrt, when it is called
upon to evaluate an alleged recriminatory defense, to ignore
the growing awareness that a marriage in name only is not
a marriage in allY real S(,l1S(,. In otller fields, equity does not
deny relief on the ground of plaintiff's unclean hands when
to do so would be harmful to tlle public interest. (See Johnson
v. Yellow Oab Transit Go., 321 U.S. 383, 387 [64 S.Ot. 62::'.,
88 L.Ed. 814]; Leo Feist, Inc. Y. Y01lng, 138 F.2d 972, 974976; Clet"eland, C .. C. d': Sf. L. Ry. Co. v. Hirsch, 204 F. 849,
857-858 [123 C.C.A. ]45] ; Menzel v. Niles 00., 86 Colo. 320,
325-326 [281 P. 364, 65 A.L.R. 995] ; Baylor v. Orooker, 97
Kan. 624. 627-628 [156 P. 737, Ann.Ca.;;. 1918D 473] : Deutschmann v. Board of Appeals of Oanton, 325 Mass. 297, 299 [90
N.E.2d 313] ; Oameron Y. International AlHonce of Theatrical
Stage Emp., 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 20-21 []76 A. 692, 97 A.L.R. 594] ;
Cosdcn Oil d': Gas Co. v. Hendrickson, 96 Okla. 206, 210 [221
P. 86] ; cf. Hobbs Y. Boatl'ight, ]95 Mo. 693, 715, 720-724 [93
S.W. 934, 113 Am.SLRep. 709, 1) IJ.R.A.N.S. 906]. See, also.
1 Story on Equity [14th ed. 1918]. §421, pp. 396-398; Pomeroy on Equity [5th ed. 1941], §941, pp. 733 et seq.; Chafee,
Som(' ProblclIls of Eqnit:v [1950], p. 95; 48 hR .A. 842; 120
A.L.n. 1461: ]3 C.J .. Contracts. § 441. p. 497: RO C .•T.S.,
Equit~·. §§ 98a. 9Sb, pp. 487-491; ]2 Am.Jur., Contraets. § 214.
pp. 729-731.) [14] Snch a rule is ('ven more appropriate
in marital litigation. ,,'jl('re the social consequences of the
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court's decree are of thp utmost importance. (See Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 219 Cal. 734, 736 [28 P.2d 914] [annulment];
Loughran v. Loughran. 2!J2 U.S. 216, 228-230 [54 8.Ct. 684,
78 L.Ed. 1219] [marital property rights].)
1t bears lloting how fl'l'C)lIcntly divorees are uncontested.
Tn lllany eases licit lWI" spouse is " innocent," and yet, by agreement, one of them defaults to ensnre a divorce. Thus a strict
recrimination rulc fails in its purpose of denying relief to
tIle guilty. Moreover, it exprts a corrupting influence on the
negotiations that precede the entry of such a default. The
spousp who more dpsperately seeks an end to a hopeless union
is penalized by the ability of the other spouse to prevent a
divorce tluough the assertion of a recriminatory defense, and
the morp unscrupulous partner may obtain substantial
financial concessiOlls as thp price of remaining silent. Were
the clean hands dodrine properly applied, it would encourage
estranged couples to bring their differences before the chancellor, where the interests of societ~· as a whole can be given
proper rerognition and where settlement negotiations can be
supervised and unfair adyantage prevented.
A mechanical application of the doctrine of recrimination
is by no means uuiversal. In some states, the defense has
been limited by requiring that the plaintiff's offense be of the
same type as the defendant's or that it involve equal guilt.
(See Bast v. Bast, 82 Ill. 584, 585; AppeltofJt v. Appeltofft,
147 lid. 603, 605 (]28 A. 273] ; Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wn.2d
593, 596 [203 P.2d 357].) Such limitations are not entirely
satisfactory, however; even when misconduct is identical the
court should be permitted to exercise a sound discretion in
the public interest. Several states expressly recognize judicial discretion concerning recrimination. (Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 153 [144 F.2d 509-510]; Stewart
v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 327-328 [29 So.2d 247, 170 AL.R.
]073}; Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kan. 65, 72 [173 P. 537];
Panther v. Pantlle1', 147 Olda. 131, 134 r295 P. 2]9]. See, also,
Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679,686 [74 P.2d 189].)
In view of the reliance of the Conant case on what was
thought to be the English rule, perhaps the most illuminating
of the modern cases on the subject is Blunt v. Blunt, [1943]
A.C. 517, 169 L.T.R. 33, decided in the House of Lords in
] 943. Significantl~', the judges in England were for many
years reluctant to exercise the discretion given them by the
Act of 1857. Eventually, however, the courts fully accepted their responsibility (Wickens v. Wickens [1918], P.
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265, 119 L.T.R. 268; Wilson v. Wilson [1920], P. 20, 122
L.T.R. 223), and, in Blunt v. Blunt, Lord Chancellor Simon
reviews the factors that should govern the decision in a given
case. Among these are tIle prospect of reconciliation and the
interests of the children of the marriage. III keeping with thc
traditional view of the law toward both marriage and divorce,
the Lord Chancellor states that the consideration of "primary
importance" is the interest of thc community at large. This
interest is "to be judged by maintaining a true balance between respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and the
social considerations which make it contrary to public policy
to insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly
broken down." ([1943] A.C. at 525, 169 L.T.R. at 34; cf.
Hill v. Hill, 23 Ca1.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] ; Weil v. Weil,
37 Ca1.2d 770, 783-784 [236 P .2d 159].)
In examining the doctrine of recrimination, we have given
the most serious consideration not only to judicial precedent
but also to the work of leading scholars and practitioners.
Few rules of law have been more widely condemned by the
legal profession. In 1948, a committee of experts of the American Bar Association joined with the representatives of other
interested groups in the work 'of the National Conference on
Family Life. The bar association's representatives, acting
as the legal section of the conference, strongly recommended
the elimination of the defense of recrimination. (Report of
Legal Section of National Conference on Family Life [1948],
pp. 1,3, 7. See, also, Chafee, Some Problems of Equity [1950],
p. 73 et seq.) In "iew of the statutory provisions on the
subject, we are not free to go so far. Moreover, we do not
believe that the comparative guilt of the parties will be without significance in every case. [16] We do believe, however, that some of the evils pointed out by the bar association committee can be avoided within the framework of the
existing statute if it is kept in mind that the doctrine of
recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean hands of which
it is a part, is neither puristic nor mechanical, but an equitable
principle to be applied according to the circumstances of
each case and with a proper respect for the paramount interests of the community at large.
Defendant relies upon Oomfort v. Oomfort, 17 Ca1.2d 736,
745-752 [112 P.2d 259]. The discussion of recrimination in
that case, however, was directed entirely to the question
whether or not the recriminatory defense there involved had
become inoperative owing to lapse of time. The court did not
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consider the language of section 122 of the Civil Code in the
light of the clean hands doctrine, nor was that issue raised
in the bricfs of t.he parties. The Comfort case therefore
does not support the proposition that the doctrine of recrimination precludes the exercise of equitable discretion.
To the extent that the fol1owing cases support a mechanical
application of the doctrine of recrimination, they are disapproved: SWl'as('.lI v. Sweasey. 126 Cal. 123, 129-130 [58 P.
456] ; IIfatfson Y. lIIattson. 181 Cal. 44,47 [183 P. 443] ; Helpling v.Helpling, 50 Ca1.App. 676, 680-681 [195 P. 715];
Braze7l v; Braze7l, 54Ca1.App.2d 458, 459 [129 P.2d 117];
Gough Y. Gough. 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 268-269 [225 P.2d
668].
[16] We have concluded that section 122 of the Civil
Code imposes upon the trial judge the duty to determine
whether or not the fault of the plaintiff in a divorce action
is to be regarded as 'lin bar" of the plaintiff's cause of
diYorce based upon the fault of the defendant. Tested by
the considerations discussed above, the evidence in the present
ease would haye been ample to support a finding that the
parties' misconduct should not bar a divorce. Reconciliation
appears impossible. The trial judge himself observed that
I'tlle marriage here was a failure from the start" and that
"there is nothing really to keep them together." There was
eyidence that defendant more than once inflicted bodily injur~' upon plaintiff; that after one severe beating plaintiff
attempted to commit suicide by an overdose of sleeping pi11s;
t.hat defendant often boasted in the presence of plaintiff and
guests of intimate relations with other women and discussed
th(>ir physical attributes in detail; that defendant was often
intoxicated; that defendant frequently told plaintiff that her
daughter by a preyions marriage had loose morals; that def(>ndant was insanely jealons of a former suitor of plaintiff
and on one oecasion seized an alarm elock giveu plaintiff by
the Imitor and threw it into the toilet; and that defendant
layishly tipped waiters and spent his money freely in public,
but in prh-ate liferefllsed to give plaintiff sufficient funds
to purchase clothes suitable for her station in life. On the
other hand, d(>f(>ndant's evidence was to the effect that plaintiff had im-ented false accusations against him; that plaintiff had deliberat(>lr attempted to ruin his business life by
writing a lett(>r to his partner falseI~· accusing dt'f(>l1dant
of elisllOnest~· Ilnel hornos(>xllality; flllft that. plAintifF nail an-
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nounced her intention of writing similar letters to other business associates of defendant. If the foregoing facts are true,
it is apparent that tIl ere has been a total and irremedial
breakdown of the marriage. Technical marital fault can play
but little part in the face of the unhappy spectacle indicated
by this evidence, with its inevitable effect upon the family,
friends, n(>ighbors, and business interests of the parties.
[17] Moreover, it is significant that the application of a
strict rule of recrimination in the present action does not
operate with equal justi(·c. As the spouse entrusted by law
wit}l tlle management and control of the community property
(see Ci". Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), defendant is in a position to use that property for his personal benefit. Although
he has an obligation to support plaintiff, a large discretion
is customarily vested in the husband concerning the manner
of performing that obligation; in the present case, disagreement and repeated legal actions to obtain support money are
almost certain to ensue.
[IS] There can be no precise formula for determining
when a cause of divorce shown against a plaintiff is to be
considered a bar to his snit for divorce, for the divorce court,
as a court of equity (Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185 [7 P. 456,
635,8 P. 709]), is clothed with a broad discretion to advance
the requirements of justice in each particular case. [19a] In
general, however, certain major considerations will govern
the court's decision:
1. The prospect of reconciliation. The court should determine whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been destro~'ed or whetlH'r there is a reasonable likelihood that
the ·marriage can be saved. It should consider the ages and
temperaments of the parties, the length of their marriage,
the seriousness and frequency of their marital misconduct
proved at the trial and the likelihood of its recurrence, the
duration and apparent finality of the separation, and the
sincerity of their efforts to overcome differences and live together harmoniously.
2. The effect of the marital conflict upon the parties. If
a continuation of the marriag(' would constitute a serious
hazard to the llealth of either party, as in the case of physical
bruta1it~·. the court shoulo bE.' reluctant to deny dh·orce. Although finaneial considerations can play only 8 minor role
in determ'ining the propripty of divorce, even these may not
be entir('l~' ignored if tll(, ('videnc(' indicates that marital ('onflicts ar(' d('stroying the lh'elihood of the parties.
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3. l'he effect of thc marital conflict upon third parties.
In every divorce case in which children are involved, their
interests arc of the utmost concern to the court. The disruptiYf~ effed. of (liYor('p upon children is to be deplored,
but in Il givell ('asp it llIay bl' preferable to violence, hatred,
or immoralitv "'hen tllesl' an' present in the home. The community as a ·who1e also has all interest. Adultery, desertion,
or cruelty, for example, can only discredit marriage; their
perpetuation is not lightly to be decreed .
. 4. Comparat1:ve guilt. In many ways the guilt of the
parties may be unequal-in the gravity of the misconduct involved, in the frequency of its occurrence, or in its effect
upon children and others. Moreover, one spouse may demonstrate substantially greater repentance and reform. Marital
offenders, therefore, arc not neeessarily in par·i delicto before
the chan('e11or. Thc'ir comparative guilt may have an important bearing upon whether or not either one or both
should be granted relief.
We have concluded that in light of the foregoing discussion the findings and conclusions in the present case are not
sufficient to support the determination that recrimination was
established. [20] It is essential that findings be made on
every material issue raised by the pleadings. (Kusel v. Kusel,
147 Cal. 52, 57 [81 P. 297] ; Faircht'ld v. Raines, 24 Ca1.2d
818, 830 [151 P.2d 260] ; Parker v. Shell Oil 00.,.29 Ca1.2d
503, 512 [175 P.2d 838] ; cf. LaMar v. LaMar, 30 Ca1.2d 898,
902 [186 P.2d 678].) As we have seen, whether or not the
cause of action proved against each spouse is to be regarded
as in bar of the ('ause of action proved against the other spouse
is a material issue and must be expressly decided by the trial
court before it may be said that recrimination has been decided. [19b] To deeide the issue raised by a plea of recrimination, the court must consider the prospects of reconciliation, the comparativc fault of the plaintiff and the defendant,
and the effert of thc marital strife upon the parties, their
rhildren, and the community.
Ppon remand of the rase 'for application of the clean hands
doctrine as herein indirated, the trial court may decide that
one of thc parties should be granted a divorce. [21] In
that event, alimony and more than half of the community
property ma~' be awarded to the prevailing spouse as in any
other ease. It is also possible, however, that a divorce will
he granted to both parties (see Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash.
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679, 686 [74 P.2d 189]; Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] A.C. 517,
531 [H.L.]), and it seems advisable to indicate here the rules
that should govern the granting of alimony and the apportionment of community property under such circumstances.
[22J When a divorce is granted to both, alimony may be
awarded to either, for the basis of liability for alimony is
the granting of a divorce against the person required to
pay it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.) [23J Section 146 of the
Civil Code provides that if the divorce is granted for extreme
cruelty, the court may apportion community property as
it deems just, but that statute has been interpreted to permit an award of more than half of the community property only to an innocent spouse. (Eslinger v. Eslinger, 47
Cal. 62, 64.) When a divorce is granted to both parties,
neither is innocent within the meaning of this rule, and the
community property must be equally divided.
The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order denying the motion for a new trial is dismissed. Defendant is
to bear the costs of this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Solely upon the ground that there are contradictory, irreconcilable findings about matters material to a
proper disposition of the ease, I concur in the reversal of the
judgment.· (Canfield v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Ca1.2d
1, 20 [87 P.2d 830] ; Hollywood Cleaning «; P. Co. v. Hollywood L. Service, Inc., 217 Cal. 131, 137 [17 P.2d 712] ; Los
Angeles etc. Land Co. v.ltlarr, 187 Cal. 126, 132 [200 P.1051] ;
Estep v. Armstrong, 91 Cal. 659, 663-665 [27 P. 1091];
Learned v. Castle, 78 Cal. 454, 460 [18 P. 872, 21 P. 11].) In
view of the conflicting evidence, it would be inappropriate for
this court to determine which finding is supported by the
greater weight of the evidence and to order judgment accordingly. (Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Ca1.2d 265, 270 [239
P.2d 625] ; T1tpman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256,269-270 [280
P. 970].)
In my opinion, these conclusions are determinative of the
appeal. If, upon retrial, the evidence should disclose that
each party has a cause of divorce" against the other, as I read
the Civil Code, tIle trial court will have no alternative but
to deny each of them a divorce. (Civ. Code, § 111[4].) Like·
wise, if it should be proved that the conduct of each was provoked by the other, a divorce must be denied either party
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because neither one will have shown a cause of divorce. Cruelty
which is provoked by thc party seeking a divorce is not actionable. (Ha,rp v. Harp, 204 Cal. 193, 194 [267 P. 101] j Popescu
'\". Popescu, 46 Cal.App.2d 44, 49 [lIn P.2d 208].) However,
it may be that, although the evidence disclose cruelty on the
part of each party, provocation for the acts of one upon the
part of the other may bc proved. In that event, the trial court
properly might award a divorce to the party whose actions
were provoked by the other.
This court cannot anticipate what the e,·idence upon another
trial may disclose. The conclusion that the findings are in
irreconcilable conflict disposes of the issue before us and the
lengthy discourse upon the doctrine of recrimination is unnecessary and unwarranted dictum. Ho,vever, because of my
disagreement with the interpretation placed upon the statutory law of this state, I am compelled to state my views upon
that question.
"The legislature has seen fit to make the doctrine [of recrimination] an integral part of the law of this state. It
is not for the courts to determine the rightness or wrongness
of the doctrine so declared. That is a legislative and not a
judicial function." (Comfort v. Comfort, 17 Cal.2d 736,
752 [112 P.2d 259].)
In effect, the court now repeals sections 111 (4) and 122
of the Civil Code. Section 111 provides: "Divorces must be
denied upon showing: . . . 4. Recrimination j • • . " (Emphasis added.) Section 122 defines recrimination as "a sho,ving by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the
plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce."
Ignoring the mandatory "must" of section 111, the majority hold that the trial court may exercise its "discretion"
in determining whether to grant a divorce where each party
has shown a cause of divorce against the other. Using the
language of Brenot v. Brc'I'Iot, 102 Cal. 294, 296 [36 P. 672],
it is said that CCa court of equity is authorized to enter a judgment dismissing an action of divorce, where both parties are
seeking a decree, and the evidence discloses them to be equally
guilty of the misconduct alleged." But in the Brenot case
no authority was cited for this conclusion, and the court did
not consider the statute. Furthermore, the quoted statement
is erroneous ill implying that the parties must be equally gui1t~
of the same misconduct. Under s('ction 122, "any cause of
divorce" is a sufficient basis for the defense of recrimination.
The cause need not bf' the same as that relied upon b~' thp
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other party. (See White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 452 [23 P.
276, 7 L.RA. 799] ; Klemmer v. Klemmer, 42 Cal.App. 618,
622 (187 P. 85].)
Reliance also is placed upon Glass v. Glass, 4 Ca1.App. 604,
607 [88 P. 734]. There tlle trial court found both parties
guilty of extreme cruelty, but granted the plaintiff a divorce.
The doctrine of reerilllinatioll was not relied upon by either
of th<' parties, nor consiLll'l"l'(l by tIle court, and the ueeision
is not allthority for tlw proposition that tIle manilatory language of sectioll 1] 1 may be disregarded.
III the present opinion "recrimination" is not defined.
IIo"'ever, the illevitable implicatiOll of the analysis of the
problem is that there is no such thing. It is acknowledged
that a cause of divorce must be proved before the doctrine of
recrimination may be applied. The conclusion is then reached i
that, after the defendant's cause is established, the trial court
must determine whether it is "in bar" of the relief sought
b~T the plaintiff.
The fallacy of s11ch circuitous reasolling lies in the misinterpretation of the pJain language of the statute. It is
assumed that the phrase "in bar of the plaintiff's cause of
divorce" refers back to the words "an~' cause of divorce."
However, the strueture of the sentence preeludes allY such
interpretation. The phrase beginning with "in bar" is a
modif~'ing one deliberately separated from the preceding
modifying language by a comma. As diagrammed in Klemmer
v. Klemme!', supra, the sentence reads: "Recrimination is a
showin{} by the defendant (If any l'anse of divorce against the
plaintiff, ?'n bar of the plaintiff's calise of divorce." (See De
Haley v. Haley, 74 Cal. 489, 492 [16 P. 248, 5 Am.St.Rep.
460].) The word "showing" is modified by two separate, and
equal, phrases. The first, "by the defendant Qf any canse of
divorce against tJle plaintiff," explains the kind of "showing"
which must be made. Such showing, if made, is "in bar of
the plaintiff's cause of divorce."
The majority say: "Had the Legislature meant Jo ma"c
every cause of divorce an absolute defense, it could easily have
pro,:,ided that: 'Divorces must be denied upon . . . a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the
plaintiff.' " They ignore the fact that section 122 is a definition of "recrimination" as used in section 111. In defining
"recrimination" as a sllOwing "in bar of the plaintiff's causp
of divorce," the code {'ommissioners simply adopted the accepted judieiaj definition of that term as stated in Conant
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v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 256 [70 Am.Dec. 717], and the English
cases there cited.
According to thc majority opinion, "The California Legislature, in enacting the Civil Cone in 1872, did not fo])ow the
principles of thl' Con;mt ease. 'rhe code provisions on recrimination made two important departures from the existing law." 'l'hese, it says, were the requirement that the defendant prove a cause of divorce against the plaintiff and
the rejection of the strict rule of the ecclesiastical courts.
But t1l(> code did not change the law as stated and applied
in the Conant case. By that decision the court did notestab}ish a doctrine that the plaintiff be "without reproach" to
secure a divorce. It held that "where the matter pleaded
is such as would entitle the defendant to a decree, had it
been presented in a bill brought by himself, the relief should
be denied." (P. 256.) In using the words "without reproach," it specifically limited them to "similar guilt, or an
offence to which the law attaches similar consequences." (P.
258.) Because the now abandoned doctrine of two types of
divorce then existed, the court did provide that a lesser guilt
would bar a divorce a '1:inculo matrirnonii. However, it is
important to note that a divorce would be granted a mensa
ct thol'o where the guilt of the plaintiff was not sufficient to
have established a cause of divorce in the defendant.
In the Conant case the court also rejected the strict rule
of the ecclesiastical courts. They had allowed only adultery
as a bar to a suit for divorce. Under the Conant decision any
offense stated by the statute could be pleaded in bar to the
same or any other offense. This departure from the ecclesiastical rule was adopted by the code commissioners. It is understandable, therefore, t.hat they should have relied upon the
general principles upon which the Conant case was decided,
rather than upon earlier divorce cases.
The note of the code commissioners states: "This section
[sec. 122] rests upon the principle that he who is himself in
the wrong cannot be heard to complain in a Court of justice
of another's wrong pertaining to the same matter." The analogy which they used is strikingly similar to that stated in
the Conant case where it was said: "It is a general principle
of the common law that whoever seeks redress for the violation of a contract resting upon mutual and dependent covenants, to obtain success, must himself have performed the
obligations on his part." That the code commissioners had
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a related principle in mind is clear from their citations of
authority. Of the decisions to which they referred, five denied relief to a plaintiff relying upon an illegal or fraudulent
contract. In each case, the basis of the holding was the doctrine of in pari delicto. (Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. K. B.
341 [Eng.]; Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. (58 Mass.) 322;
Roby v. West, 4 N.H. 285 [17 Am.Dec. 423); Freeman v.,
Sedwick,6 Gill (Md.) 28, 29, 39-40 [46 Am.Dec. 650] ; Greg- I
ory v. Haworth, 25 Cal. 653, 657.) Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow.
(N.Y.) 78 [13 Am.Dec. 513), stated the doctrine of contributory negligence as a defense to an action for gross negligence.
Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 150 [4 Am.Dec. 258), held
that a person having only the naked possession of land cannot maintain an action in trespass against a person having
possessory title who has entered by force and evicted the
possessor.
None of the decisions cited by the commissioners considered
the public policy argument now presented. The full quotation from Freeman v. Sedwick, supra, the only one of those
cases here relied upon, is as follows: "After a careful examination of the authorities, we are brought to the conclusion
that Courts of equity have held, and uniformly decided, that
it was both the wisdom and policy of the law to withhold
all aid or relief from parties in controversies between themselves, who stood strictly in pari delicto, which might or could
tend to the consummation of agreements entered into in fraud
of the law, or the rights of any person. Mr. Justice Story, in
his Commentary on Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 1, p. 317, sec.
298, says: 'The suppression of illegal contracts is far more
likely, in general, to be accomplished by leaving the parties
without remedy against each other, and by thus introducing
a preventive check, naturally connected with a want of confidence, and a sole reliance upon personal honor. And so,
accordingly, the modern doctrine is established. Relief is
not granted, where both parties are truly in pari delicto,
unless in casE'S where public policy would thereby be promoted.' "
The notes of the code commissioners, annotated by two of
them, were first published by H. S. Crocker and Company
in an 1872 edition of the Civil Code. In the preface to the
annotated edition, those commissioners stated: "In some places
the Code modifies or alters what has heretofore been the law.
Wherever this occurs the reason for the change is given-the
hardships which existed under the former law, and how the
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present enactment applies to prevent their future occurrence." (P. vi.)
Following out this purpose the commissioners noted every
instance in which it was their intention to depart from the
preexisting law. Illustrative of their comments are the following: "Sections 170 and 171 modify the common law in
two respects." (§ 170, p. 58.) "This was the rule of the
common law. The Commission deemed it advisable to modify
it." (§ 710, p. 215.) "The words 'or for' are intended to
supersede the doctrine of Sieman v. Austin,
(§ 853,
p. 249.) "This section is a departure from the rule laid
do'Wn in .. (the cited) case." (§ 908, p. 260.) "The
three preceding sections change the rule of our statutes
" (§ 1286, p. 359.) "This is an innovation upon the
common law . . . 0" (§ 1496, p. 443.) "This is contrary to
the former law upon this subject . . . . " (§ 1500, p. 444.)
"This Chapter undoubtedly modifies the rule heretofore existing in this State as to mistake of law." (§ 1576, p. 467.)
"This section modifies the law heretofore existing." (§ 1714,
p. 519.) "This section, and !'lome of the ensuing ones, differ materially from the common law .
(§ 1864, p.
573.) Further examples of this careful attention to alterations in the prior law appear in the annotations to sections
245, 296, 400, 954, 1383, 1384, 1488, ] 624, 1658, and 1941.
Had the code commissioners intended to modify the doctrine of recrimination, as stated in the Conant case, so drastically as it is now said that they did, certainly they would
have been as explicit in the annotation to section 122 as they
were in their notes to other sections. It is clear that the
commissioners made every effort to leave nothing to implication and to stress each alteration or clarification which was
intended by their work. If it was their intention to adopt,
as a limitation upon the defense of recrimination, the dictum
exception to the doctrine of in pari delicto mentioned in the
fluot.ation from Mr. Justice Story by the Maryland court
in the Freeman case, it would have been a simple matter to
word the statute accordingly. Instead, the commissioners
provided that "any cause of divorce against the plaintiff" is a sufficient showing in bar of the plaintiff's cause
and requires a denial of relief. Rather than stating any modifieation or alteration of what was theretofore the law, they
bolstered the unequivocal language of the statute by explaininJ! that "he W110 is himself in the wrong cannot be heard
0
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to complain." The authorities which they cited denied relief
in each instance. Certainly if they had intended any such
exception as is now added to the code section, they would
have modified the language of the statute, mentioned that
purpose in their annot;ltion, ur at least have cited authorities applying the exception to the gcneral rule.
By now saying that "tit!' cunsiderations uf policy that
prompt the state to consent to a divorce when one spouse
has been guilty of misconduct arc often doubly present when
both spouses have been guilty," ill effect, this court repeals
the statutory rule of recrimination. Thus, in any case where,
by the terms of the statute, recrimination is a bar, it should
not be applied because of public policy. Only the embalmed
corpse of the doctrine is preserved, impotent in the shroud
of standards establislled "for determining when a eanse of
divorce shown against a plaintiff is to be considered a bar
to his suit for divorce."
Among other standards which the trial court must now use
to determine whether the cause proyed is "in bar" of the
plaintiff's cause of divorce is one called" comparative guilt."
No authority is giwn for this invention, startling as applied
to the grounds for divorce, and indeed, none can be found
for it. Section 92 of the Civil Code provides that dh'orces
mar be granted for anyone of seven enumerated causes. No
distinction is made between them, nor are there varying degrees of any cause. All stand on an equal footing insofar as
the granting of a dh'orce is concerned. "In this State, the
statute has specified ef'rtain acts or conduct which shall constitute !!rounds of divorce and so far as the matrimonial
contract is concerned. the Courts cannot distinguish between
them, whatever difference there may be in a moral point of
yjew." (Conant Y. Conant, supra" p. 256.)
'Yheth(lr a caus(' of di\'OJ'ce is E'stablish('il is simply a matter
of proof. If the cvidel1c(' is sllffir.ient to sl1stnin n decrec npon
nn~' one of thE' stntlltory g"l'oullils, a ('nllse of diYorce is proyed
nnd cllnmlative (,yjc1ellce (lo('s 110t ~iyf' it !!rrater Ilallctity.
Eitlwl' n calise of (lh'o1'l't' is establislH'<l or it is not. Once
I'"tnhlbhl'd. it ill T1('ithl'r·mo)·p 1101' ll'lls ('ff(,(·tiw thnn all~' otlH'r
('nllSl' «IS t hc' basis fo)' a (li \'ore'l' or a hal' to t11(' ot111'1' SpOllSE' 's
,'allSl' of 11i \'01'('1' , A1HI ~·et. it i" no\\' held. th('st' ":1l1""S. I'qnal
IIlJ{lf'l' the In\\'. mllst in SoltH' lll('tllph~-"i('al fashion hI' 1I1ea'-;Url'<l
II)' weighed hy tlll' trinl .ilH1~e. By comparin~ the' ('qnal, iT1,·qunli1y 1IIm- 111' cli~l'nYl'l'l'(l RI'~'on(l thl' snpl'rla1 ive of "I'X11'1'111('" or "n1Il1ost" enll'lty tIl(' I'olld mn~' 111111 nn intlpscrib-
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abl(' infinity which is more than utmost, an unimaginablr Of'·
grpr of I'rllrlty whil·h is grcatl'r than the greatest.
That tlw lloetl'iJ1c of rrerimination has bren repealed is madr
cJ'ystal clc'ar by thr snggrstion "that a divorce will be grant cd
1II both parti('~." Tllr. !:o(le mil kes no proyjsiol1 for snch a dp·
('J'l'r and thr 1'('1; \I It isconl l'ary to tIle reljuirernent that a
<li\'o}'!:,' "mllst 1)(' ,h'lliC',l" WllPll rrcriminatiol! is proy{'(l.
"Ccrtain l'OlIS('qll('II('('S UI'(' attadll'tl to tlw <I"l'I'('(', illllr-pendenl
(If the dissollltioll of thr llIarriage ('ontrad, an(l they are geJlnally 11101'(' fa;-orabl,' to thr part~· obtainillg the relief tlla1l
to the contrstant; but a decree cannot be granted in favor
of on('. and aftrrwanls in favor of the other, as the first wOlll(l
diss(,jyl' the marriaf!r, and tl1l'n no marriagp would subsist.
n}1OIl whi('h thr second decrrc could act; and a drcree granting'
a di\'orce ill favor of cach, would br an anomalous proceeding." (Conant Y. Conant, supra.)
The Civil C(>(le contemplates that a divorce can be awarded
to only olJe party. Sel'tion 131 provides in part: "If it elf'1ermines that the ojYoree ought to be granted, an interlocutory
judgment mnst be entered, dl:'claring that the party in "hose
fin-or the conrt deci(les is entitled to CI diYoree; . . . " (Emphasis added.)
It is lJOteworthy than the only American anthority citeo
for the proposition that both parties may be awarded a decree
is Plagg v. Plagg, 192 ,\Yash. 679, 686 [74 P.2d 189], decided
in H jurisdietioll which has no statnte relating to recrimination. Eycn there, no authority was cited for the holding, nor
has the dedsioll since been follcnwd.
The anomaly of awardillg a llivor!:e to both parties is further stressed b~' the discussion of alimony and property rights.
The majority say: "When a divorce is granted to both, alimony may be awarded to either, for the basis of liability for
alimony is the granting of a diYorce against the person reo
quired to pay it. (See Ciy. Code, § 139.)" But section 139, as
lllllelllled in 1!)51, eOlltr11lplates, in the singular, only "the'
party against whom the decree or judgment is granted." No
provision is made for the situation where a decree is grantl:'d
against both parties. That sneh an eventuality was not antiri.
pated by the Legislature is obvious from section 14~, which
pl'ovides: "",,'lwll the prcl'ailing party in the action has either
a separah' fostatt', or is PHl'lling his or her own lh·elihood . . . .
the court ill its discretion, may withhold any all0"an('e to the
pl'fl'nililll7 pal'iy out of th(' separate property of tl1P other
party." (Emphasis a<1(kd.) Cle'arly, the Legiglatnre (lid not
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foresee a prevailing party against whom the decree might be
granted.
By statutf', 32 Anlf'rie<lll jurisnictions allm\' the defense of
recrIllllJ1ntioll. In only tllrt'!' of these Illay the ("o11rt, in its
(liscrrtioll. grant a diY(\l'l'r nftr1' proof of ree1'iminatiol1. Ex('rpt for theRC thrre, rc('riminatiol1 is, by statute. an absolute
oefrl1sc in the majority of s1:11rs. (2 Yrl'niel', ;\me1'ican Family
Laws. p. 87.) 1'hr decisions from ot])r1' states and England,
hrre citrd as rrcog-nizilll! jndicial clisrretiol1, all rely upon
different statutes or drelare judicial p(ilic~- in the absence of
statute. The poliry "'hid] l111<1r1'lirs these exeeptions to the
g'rllcral rule may be commendablr. Bnl this conrt sho11ld not
usurp the ]rgislatiYe p1'erogatiYe by the dcyice of interpreting
n statute which llreds 110 intrrpretntioll, ano which has been
accepted v;ithout question for 80 ~-enrs. If public policy
no longer approves tl](' (loctrine of rrcrimination, then it is for
the Legislature, ano not for the court, to repeal the statute.
Spence. J., concurred.
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment of reversal on tIle ground that the findings are
contradictory and irreconcilable. I disagree with the meaning given to the phrase "in bar of the plaintiff's cause of
divorce" which appears in section 122 of the Civil Code. It
seems to me that those ,yords were inserted in the statute
for a purpose foreign to that no\\' asrribed to them.
Section III of the Civil Code reads: "Divorces must be
denied upon showing . . . 4. Recrimination." The limitation of that defense in an action for divorce is continued in
section 122. That section defines "R,ecrimination" as "a
showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the
plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce." Separate
maintenance is an available remedy ,,-I]ere a canse of divorce
exists (Civ. Code, § 137), but because of a showing of recrimination a divorce may not be granted (§ 111).
There is thus no warrant for disapproving or overruling
prior cases. When, as in this cas(', the conrt is faced with a
sJlOwing of recrimination (any cause of divorce) on the part
of each spouse in resisting a divorce sought by the other,
there is no choice except to deny the divorce to both. On a
record whicl] undeniably supports a finding of recrimination
on the part of each sponse, the trial court must be assumed
to have rxrrcisrd all of thr discretion that it had if the denial
of thf' divorce was based on that finding.

